“Dynamic mechanism design for a global commons”. Rodrigo Harrison’s CICS Lecture

Jueves, 22 Mayo, 2014 | CALENDAR, EVENTS, NEWS

Harrison CICS_WEB


Rodrigo Harrison is currently an Assistant Professor at the Instituto de Economía of Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. He obtained his Ph. D. in Economics at the Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA. 

Lecture: “Dynamic mechanism design for a global commons”

When: Tuesday, 27th May, 14:00 hrs.

Where: Sala Penal, Universidad del Desarrollo, campus Rector Ernesto Silva Bafalluy, Av. La Plaza 680, Las Condes.

Language: Spanish (questions and commentaries in English are very welcome).

Abstract: We model dynamic mechanisms for a global commons. Countries benefit from both consumption and aggregate conservation of an open access resource. A coun- try’s relative value of consumption-to-conservation is privately observed and evolves stochastically. An optimal quota maximizes world welfare subject to being imple- mentable by Perfect Bayesian equilibria. With complete information, the optimal quota is first best; it allocates more of the resource each period to countries with high consumption value. Under incomplete information, the optimal quota is fully compressed — initially identical countries always receive the same quota even as environmental costs and resource needs differ later on.